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Abstract 
Almost all previous studies on optimal taxation and status consumption are based on closed 
model-economies. This paper analyzes how international capital mobility – which may 
constrain the use of capital income taxation – affects the optimal redistributive income tax 
policy in a small open economy when consumers care about their relative consumption. If the 
government can perfectly observe (and tax) returns on savings abroad, it is shown that the 
policy rules for marginal labor and capital income taxation derived for a closed economy 
largely carry over to the small open economy analyzed here. However, if these returns are 
unobserved by the government, the marginal tax policy rules will be very different from those 
pertaining to closed model-economies. In this case, capital income taxes on domestic savings 
will be completely ineffective, since such taxes would induce the consumers to move their 
savings abroad. The labor income tax must then indirectly also reflect the corrective purpose 
that the absent capital income tax would otherwise have had. 
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1. Introduction 
   People care about their relative consumption, i.e., how much they consume relative to other 
people’s consumption.1 While this insight has a long history, and was noted already by the 
founding fathers of economics including Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, the literature 
dealing with optimal tax policy implications of relative consumption comparisons is more 
recent. A major finding in this literature is that such comparisons imply much higher optimal 
marginal income tax rates than in standard economic models, due to that concerns for relative 
consumption give rise to large negative externalities (often referred to as positional 
externalities). It also explains how this corrective tax element is modified when information 
asymmetries prevent redistribution through lump-sum taxes.
2
  
   Most earlier studies dealing with tax policy implications of social comparisons are based on 
static models, and thus do not address the potential role of capital income taxation. This 
omission is important, since relative consumption concerns give rise to a corrective as well as 
redistributive motive for using capital income taxation. To our knowledge, Aronsson and 
Johansson-Stenman (2010) was the first paper to analyze the role of capital income taxation in 
an economy where people care about relative consumption, and where the government can 
simultaneously use an optimal nonlinear labor income tax for purposes of redistribution and 
externality correction.
3
 They found that consumer preferences for relative consumption have 
important implications for capital income taxation even if the labor income tax is optimal, 
since the positional externalities that consumers impose on one another may vary over the 
individual life-cycle as well as vary over time in general. The more (less) positional people 
become over time, the stronger will typically be the argument for taxing (subsidizing) savings 
at the margin. For instance, if people become more positional when their income increases, as 
suggested by empirical evidence in Clark et al. (2008), there would be an incentive to tax 
capital income at the margin in a growing economy where people become more positional 
over time. Similarly, if the young are more positional than the old, which is consistent with 
                                                          
1
 For empirical evidence from happiness and questionnaire-experimental research, see, e.g., Easterlin (1995, 
2001), Johansson-Stenman et al., (2002), Blanchflower and Oswald (2005), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Solnick 
and Hemenway (2005), Carlsson et al. (2007), and Clark and Senik, 2010). 
2
 The earlier literature in this area includes Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Oswald (1983), Tuomala (1990), 
Ljunqvist and Uhlig (2000), Dupor and Liu (2003), Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008), and Eckerstorfer 
and Wendner (2013). 
3
 See also Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2014a) for a generalization, in particular with respect to the nature 
of the social comparisons. See Abel (2005) for a study of first best optimal capital income taxation in a 
representative-agent economy (without any labor income tax), where the representative consumer has 
preferences for relative consumption. 
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some empirical evidence (Pingle and Mitchell, 2002; Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson, 
2006), it is for this reason desirable to subsidize capital income at the margin. 
   However, the studies on optimal taxation referred to above, and indeed almost all previous 
studies in the policy-oriented literature on relative consumption, are based on closed model-
economies.
4
 This is problematic when dealing with capital taxation since most (if not all) 
developed countries are open to capital mobility. The main contribution of the present paper is 
to generalize the setting of Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010) to a small open economy 
with capital mobility, in which individuals may either invest their savings domestically or 
abroad. This generalization is clearly important because capital mobility may seriously restrict 
the use of capital income taxation as a means of correction and redistribution.  
   The point of departure is the optimal income tax model with overlapping generations (OLG) 
developed by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010), where (realistic) information 
asymmetries prevent the government from using type specific lump-sum taxes for purposes of 
redistribution. This model is here augmented with an international capital market and 
embedded into the framework of a small open economy.
5
 A small open economy is here 
meant to imply that the country is small enough for its government to treat the world market 
interest rate as exogenous; a realistic assumption for many (if not most) countries. We will, 
nevertheless, comment on how the results would change if the economy is large in the sense 
that the government is able to (strategically) affect the world market interest rate. 
   The scope for capital income taxation will, of course, depend on whether all capital income 
is observable to the government. Following the notational convention in the literature on 
capital income taxation in open economies, we will refer to source-based capital income 
taxation when the capital income is taxed at source, i.e., imposed by the country where this 
income is generated, irrespective of whether the income earner is a domestic or foreign 
resident. Residence-based capital income taxation in contrast means that the tax is levied on 
the citizens of a particular country irrespective of whether they earn their income at 
domestically or abroad. An individual who lives in, say, the UK and who saves domestically 
will then be taxed by the UK government for the savings returns based on both the sourced-
based tax (since the savings are undertaken in the UK) and the residence-based tax (since the 
                                                          
4
 To our knowledge, the only exceptions are Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2014b, 2015): the former 
examines the optimal provision of public goods and the latter deals with optimal income taxation in multi-
country economies with social comparisons within as well as between countries. 
5
 Many earlier studies have examined the implications of international capital mobility for revenue collection and 
provision of public goods at the national level in contexts without relative consumption comparisons; see, e.g., 
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986), Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991), and Huber (1999). See also 
Aronsson and Sjögren (2014), who analyze tax policy implications of quasi-hyperbolic discounting in an 
economy with international capital mobility. 
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saving is done by a UK citizen). If the same individual instead saves in Switzerland, then the 
UK government will only tax him/her through the residence-based tax, while the Swiss 
government may tax him/her through the source-based tax in Switzerland.  
   We will throughout the paper assume that the government can perfectly observe, and hence 
tax, the returns on capital within its own country; hence, it can impose source-based taxes 
without restrictions. Yet, we also assume, as is commonly done in the literature, that capital is 
perfectly mobile between countries while people are immobile,
6
 and that the governments in 
different countries do not coordinate their capital tax policies. The possibility to observe the 
returns on savings abroad, and hence to implement residence-based capital income taxation, is 
much less obvious in practice. We will analyze the two extreme cases where such returns can 
either be observed perfectly or not observed at all. If the government can perfectly observe the 
returns on savings abroad, and can thus use a flexible nonlinear residence-based capital 
income tax, it is shown in Section 3 that the optimal tax policy rules derived for a closed 
economy by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010) largely carry over to the small open 
economy analyzed here. In addition it is shown that there would be no role for a source-based 
capital income tax since such a tax would induce people to move their savings abroad to 
escape this part of the capital tax (other small open economies would for the same reason 
have no source-based taxes). If, on the other hand, the government cannot observe (and tax) 
the returns on savings abroad, the tax policy rules will be dramatically different, as shown in 
Section 4. Yet, here too, the source-based capital income tax will be completely ineffective 
for the same reason as above. Instead, the labor income tax must indirectly, and imperfectly, 
reflect also the corrective purpose that the absent capital income tax would otherwise have 
had.  
   Although one may question the extreme case where the residence-based capital tax 
instrument cannot be used at all, it is arguably realistic that such a tax instrument cannot be 
used to its full potential. This would require a perfect international information sharing system 
where all relevant source-countries assist the domestic government in the collection of 
revenue.
7
 And as long as residence-based capital income taxation cannot be fully used, the 
mechanisms derived for the extreme case without any possibility to use residence-based 
                                                          
6
 None of these assumptions are of course strictly fulfilled in reality; there are still some transaction costs 
associated with international capital mobility, and people do move between countries. Yet, capital is for sure 
considerably more mobile than people.  
7
 See also Baccetta and Espinosa (1995) and Eggert and Kolmar (2002), who have studied this information-
exchange problem. 
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taxation will still be relevant, i.e., what matters is that the government is forced into a corner 
solution for the  residence-based tax. 
   The basic structure of the model is presented in Section 2, while the optimal tax policy with 
and without the possibility of using residence-based capital income taxation is addressed in 
Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.  
 
2. The Model 
   Following Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010), we consider an OLG economy and 
assume that each individual lives for two periods; works in the first and is retired in the 
second. Individuals are of two types, where the low-ability type (type 1) is less productive in 
the labor market - and consequently earns a lower before-tax wage rate - than the high-ability 
type (type 2). Those entering the economy in period t (who are active in the labor market in 
period t and retired in period t+1) will be referred to as generation t; 𝑛𝑖,𝑡 will similarly denote 
the number of individuals of ability-type i (for i=1,2) in generation t. 
 
2.1 Individual Preferences, Constraints, and Choices 
   An individual derives utility from his/her absolute consumption when young, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡, and old, 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1, and use of leisure when young, 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 = 1 − 𝑙𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑙 denotes work hours and the time 
endowment has been normalized to one. The utility also depends on the individual’s relative 
consumption when young and old.
8
 We model relative consumption as the difference between 
the individual’s own consumption and a measure of reference consumption. Using a bar 
symbol for reference consumption, we can then express the relative consumption of an 
individual of type i who is young in period t as ∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐?̅?. The relative consumption of 
the same individual when old can similarly be written as ∆𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑥 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑐?̅?+1. We will 
throughout the paper follow convention in assuming that the reference consumption in each 
time period can be defined as the average consumption in the economy as a whole, such that 
𝑐?̅? =
𝑛1,𝑡𝑐1,𝑡+𝑛2,𝑡𝑐2,𝑡+𝑛1,𝑡−1𝑥1,𝑡+𝑛2,𝑡−1𝑥2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
,    (1) 
                                                          
8
 The limited empirical evidence available suggests that individuals are much less positional in terms of leisure 
than in terms of visible consumption goods, such as houses and cars, and income (Alpizar et al., 2005; Solnick 
and Hemenway, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2007). 
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in which 𝑁𝑡 = 𝑛1,𝑡 + 𝑛2,𝑡 + 𝑛1,𝑡−1 + 𝑛2,𝑡−1 denotes the total population in period t. The life-
time utility function facing any individual of ability-type i and generation t can then be written 
as 
𝑈𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖,𝑡(𝑐𝑖,𝑡, 𝑧𝑖,𝑡, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1, ∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 , ∆𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑥 ).                         (2) 
This utility function is assumed to be increasing in each argument and strictly quasi-concave. 
   We follow Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) and define the degree of positionality as a 
measure of the extent to which the marginal utility of consumption is driven by concerns for 
relative consumption. Since each individual lives for two periods, we can distinguish between 
the degree of positionality when young and when old. For any individual of ability-type i and 
generation t, these two measures can be written as 
𝛼𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 =
𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡/𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐
𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑐𝑖,𝑡+𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡/𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐      and      𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑥 =
𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡/𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑥
𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1+𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡/𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑥 .                 (3) 
𝛼𝑖,𝑡
𝑐  is interpretable as the fraction of the utility gain of an additional dollar spent on 
consumption that is due to increased relative consumption when young in period t. In the 
extreme case where 𝛼𝑖,𝑡
𝑐   approaches one, all that matters is relative consumption (i.e., the 
marginal utility of absolute consumption is zero), whereas the mirror case where 𝛼𝑖,𝑡
𝑐   
approaches zero reflects the conventional assumption where relative consumption does not 
matter at all.  𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑥  has an analogous interpretation when old in period t+1.  
   Each individual has the option of investing his/her savings at home or abroad. Let ?̅?𝑡
𝑛 denote 
the foreign rate of return before any residence-based capital income tax (although after 
source-based taxation). The after-tax rate of return of a domestic investment is given by 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 = (1 − 𝜃𝑖,𝑡
𝑟 )(1 − 𝜃𝑡
𝑠)𝑟𝑡, where 𝜃𝑖,𝑡
𝑟  denotes the residence-based marginal capital income 
tax rate facing ability-type i, 𝜃𝑡
𝑠 denotes the source-based tax rate, 𝑟𝑡 denotes the domestic 
before-tax interest rate, and the total marginal capital income tax rate can be calculated as 
𝜃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖,𝑡
𝑟 + 𝜃𝑡
𝑠 − 𝜃𝑖,𝑡
𝑟 𝜃𝑡
𝑠.
9
 Note that all individuals face the same source-based tax rate.
10
 We 
assume that capital is perfectly mobile, which means that the following equilibrium condition 
applies (since the residence-based rate cancels out on both sides): 
                                                          
9
 This is based on Aronsson and Sjögren (2014). Another formulation would be to assume 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖,𝑡
𝑟 + 𝜃𝑡
𝑠. This 
formulation is more restrictive, since equation (4) then implies 𝜃1,𝑡 = 𝜃2,𝑡, in which case the government does 
not have a fully flexible capital income tax. 
10
 It would be very difficult for the government to differentiate the source based tax rate among the different 
consumer types since those facing the higher rate would invest their savings abroad instead of at home. 
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?̅?𝑡
𝑛 = (1 − 𝜃𝑡
𝑠  )𝑟𝑡.                    (4) 
Let 𝜏𝑖,𝑡 denote the marginal labor income tax rate, 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 the before-tax wage, 𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 =
(1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡)𝑤𝑖,𝑡 the after-tax marginal wage rate and 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 saving. The budget constraint facing 
any individual of ability-type i and generation t can then be summarized by the following two 
equations:
11
 
 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡                  (5a)  
 𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑖,𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛 ) − Φ𝑖,𝑡+1                 (5b) 
where 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 and Φ𝑖,𝑡+1 are lump-sum components of the tax system.
12
 Each individual acts as 
an atomistic agent and treats the factor prices, tax variables (marginal tax rates and lump-sum 
components), and the measures of reference consumption as exogenous. The individual first-
order conditions for work hours and saving can then be written as 
 
 
𝜕𝑈𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑐𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 −
𝜕𝑈𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑧𝑖,𝑡
= 0                  (6a)       
 
𝜕𝑈𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1
(1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛 ) −
𝜕𝑈𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑐𝑖,𝑡
= 0                 (6b) 
where 𝜕𝑈𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡/𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐  and 𝜕𝑈𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡/𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑥 . 
Equations (5) and (6) implicitly define the following labor supply and savings functions: 
 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑖,𝑡(𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 , 𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛 , 𝑇𝑖,𝑡, Φ𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝑐?̅?, 𝑐?̅?+1)                 (7a)
 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖,𝑡(𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 , 𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛 , 𝑇𝑖,𝑡, Φ𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝑐?̅?, 𝑐?̅?+1)                (7b) 
for i=1,2. 
 
2.2 Production and Equilibrium 
   We assume that the production technology is characterized by constant returns to scale. 
Identical, competitive firms produce a homogenous good, and we normalize their number to 
                                                          
11
 This way of formulating the budget constraint with optimal nonlinear income taxes is chosen for analytical 
convenience. It is equivalent to a formulation where both types in each time period face the same general, 
nonlinear labor income and capital income taxation tax functions; see e.g. Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman 
(2010, 2014a). 
12
 One way to interpret these lump-sum components is in terms of intercepts of locally linearized budget 
constraints, i.e., adjustments due to that inframarginal units of income are not taxed at the marginal rates.    
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one for notational convenience. Let 𝐹(𝐿𝑡, 𝐾𝑡) be the production function, where 𝐿𝑡 denotes 
effective labor and 𝐾𝑡 the capital stock used in the domestic production. In turn, effective 
labor is given by 𝐿𝑡 = 𝑎1𝐿1,𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐿2,𝑡, where 0 < 𝑎1 < 𝑎2 are fixed parameters, while 
𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑖,𝑡 denotes the total number of work hours by type i in period t. The necessary 
conditions equate marginal products and factor prices such that 
𝑎1
𝜕𝐹𝑡
𝜕𝐿𝑡
− 𝑤1,𝑡 = 0,          𝑎2
𝜕𝐹𝑡
𝜕𝐿𝑡
− 𝑤2,𝑡 = 0,          
𝜕𝐹𝑡
𝜕𝐾𝑡
− 𝑟𝑡 = 0.  (8) 
Finally, let 𝑄𝑡 denote the part of the aggregate savings invested abroad in period t. It follows 
from the national accounts that 
 𝐾𝑡 + 𝑄𝑡 = ∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1𝑖=1,2 .                   (9) 
By combining equations (4), (8), and (9), and then using the measure of aggregate labor input 
𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑖,𝑡 for i=1,2, we can derive an equation system that implicitly defines 𝑤1,𝑡, 𝑤2,𝑡, 𝑟𝑡, 
𝐾𝑡, and 𝑄𝑡 as functions of  𝜃𝑡, 𝑙1,𝑡, 𝑙2,𝑡, 𝑠1,𝑡−1, and 𝑠2,𝑡−1, i.e., 
𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑖,𝑡(𝜃𝑡, 𝑙1,𝑡, 𝑙2,𝑡, 𝑠1,𝑡−1, 𝑠2,𝑡−1)    for i=1,2              (10a) 
 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡(𝜃𝑡 , 𝑙1,𝑡, 𝑙2,𝑡, 𝑠1,𝑡−1, 𝑠2,𝑡−1)               (10b) 
 𝐾𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡(𝜃𝑡, 𝑙1,𝑡, 𝑙2,𝑡, 𝑠1,𝑡−1, 𝑠2,𝑡−1)               (10c) 
 𝑄𝑡 = 𝑄𝑡(𝜃𝑡, 𝑙1,𝑡, 𝑙2,𝑡, 𝑠1,𝑡−1, 𝑠2,𝑡−1)               (10d) 
where 𝑙1,𝑡, 𝑙2,𝑡, 𝑠1,𝑡−1, and 𝑠2,𝑡−1 are defined in equations (7a) and (7b), while population 
variables (the number of individuals of each type) have been suppressed to avoid unnecessary 
notation. 
 
2.3 The Government and Optimal Taxation 
   The social objective function is assumed to be Utilitarian 
𝑊 = ∑ ∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑈𝑖,𝑡𝑖=1,2
∞
𝑡=0 .     (11) 
This specific functional form simplifies the calculations. It is not important for the efficiency 
conditions presented below. Indeed, the qualitative results would continue to hold for any 
social objective function that is increasing in the utility of each type in each time period. They 
would also continue to hold when the social objective is to obtain a Pareto efficient allocation, 
i.e. when the utility of a specific type in a specific time period is maximized, while utility of 
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the other type in the same time period, as well as the utility of both types in all other time 
periods, are held fixed.  
   The government is assumed to observe the labor and capital income at the individual level, 
whereas individual ability is private information. We also (and quite realistically) assume that 
the government wants to redistribute from the high-ability to the low-ability type. To 
eliminate the incentive for high-ability individuals to mimic the low-ability type in order to 
gain from this redistribution, the following self-selection constraint will be imposed: 
𝑈2,𝑡 = 𝑢2,𝑡(𝑐2,𝑡, 𝑧2,𝑡, 𝑥2,𝑡+1, ∆2,𝑡
𝑐 , ∆2,𝑡+1
𝑥 ) ≥ ?̂?2,𝑡(𝑐1,𝑡, ?̂?2,𝑡, 𝑥1,𝑡+1, ∆1,𝑡
𝑐 , ∆1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ) = ?̂?2,𝑡.   (12) 
The left hand side of the weak inequality (12) is the utility of the true high-ability type, and 
the right hand side the utility of the mimicker. A mimicker earns the same labor and capital 
income, and consumes as much in both periods, as the low-ability type. The variable ?̂?2,𝑡 =
1 − 𝜙𝑙1,𝑡 denotes the time spent on leisure by the mimicker: since the mimicker is more 
productive than the low-ability type, we have ?̂?2,𝑡 = 1 − 𝜙𝑙1,𝑡 > 𝑧1,𝑡. 
   With a full set of tax instruments, and by using 𝜏𝑖,𝑡𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛  and 𝜃𝑖,𝑡𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 , 
the public budget constraint can be written as 
  0 = ∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑡[(𝑤𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 )𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑖,𝑡]𝑖=1,2 + ∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1[Φ𝑖,𝑡 + (𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 )𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1]𝑖=1,2 − 𝜃𝑡
𝑠𝑟𝑡𝑄𝑡.  (13) 
Equation (13) abstracts from public expenditure on public and private goods, which are of no 
concern in the analysis to follow. 
   The public decision-problem is then to choose the policy vector (𝜃𝑡
𝑠, 𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 , 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 , 𝑇𝑖,𝑡, Φ𝑖,𝑡+1) for 
i=1,2 and all t to maximize the social welfare function given in equation (11) subject to the 
self-selection and budget constraints in equations (12) and (13), as well as subject to the 
private sector optimality and equilibrium conditions given in equations (7), (8), and (10). The 
Lagrangean can then be written as follows: 
ℒ = ∑ ∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑈𝑖,𝑡
𝑖=1,2
∞
𝑡=0
+ ∑ 𝜆𝑡(𝑈2,𝑡 − ?̂?2,𝑡)
∞
𝑡=0
+ ∑ 𝜇𝑡 (𝑐?̅? − ∑
(𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1𝑥𝑖,𝑡)
𝑁𝑡
𝑖=1,2
)
∞
𝑡=0
 
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑡 [ ∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑡[(𝑤𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 )𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑖,𝑡]
𝑖=1,2
+ ∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1[Φ𝑖,𝑡 + (𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 )𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1]
𝑖=1,2
− 𝜃𝑡
𝑠𝑟𝑡𝑄𝑡]
∞
𝑡=0
 
where 𝜆𝑡 and 𝛾𝑡 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the self-selection constraint and 
the budget constraint in period 𝑡, respectively. The government attempts to redistribute and 
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internalize the positional externality that the relative consumption concerns give rise to. Note 
that we have included equation (1) – which shows how the reference consumption is 
determined - as an explicit constraint, and 𝜇𝑡 denotes the associated Lagrange multiplier. 
 
3. Optimal Tax Policy under Residence-Based Capital Income Taxes  
   We begin by discussing the second best optimal marginal tax structure, which solves the 
optimal tax problem described above where the government has a full set of tax instruments, 
and continue in Section 4 with a restricted optimal tax problem without the residence-based 
capital income tax. Let 
 ?̅?𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑡
𝑥
𝑖=1,2
𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑡
𝑐
𝑖=1,2
𝑛𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
   
denote the average degree of positionality measured among those alive in period t. Since all 
individuals compare their own consumption with the average consumption, we can interpret 
the average degree of positionality as measuring the value of the marginal consumption 
externality per unit of consumption.
13
 Also, let ?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐  and ?̂?2,𝑡+1
𝑥  denote the degree of 
positionality of the young and old mimicker, respectively, of generation t, which are 
calculated as in equations (3) although based on the mimicker’s utility function. 
 
   The social shadow price of reference consumption, 𝜇𝑡, plays an important role in the tax 
policy described below. This shadow price reflects the welfare effect of a decrease in 𝑐?̅?, 
ceteris paribus, and is given as follows at the second best optimum: 
  𝜇𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡 𝛾𝑡
?̅?𝑡
1−?̅?𝑡
−
1
(1−?̅?𝑡)
[𝜆𝑡−1
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡
(?̂?2,𝑡
𝑥 − 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥 ) + 𝜆𝑡
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
(?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐 − 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐 )]   (14) 
Equation (14) takes the same form as the corresponding shadow price derived for a closed 
economy by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010). The first term on the right hand side 
reflects the efficiency cost of the positional consumption externality and depends on the 
average degree of positionality. The intuition is that the larger the positional externality, the 
greater will be the welfare benefit of a decrease in 𝑐?̅?, which explains why this component 
works to increase the shadow price (i.e., making it more desirable to reduce 𝑐?̅? from the 
                                                          
13
 Empirical literature has repeatedly found the average degree of positionality to be quite large both for income 
(which can be seen as a summary measure of consumption in general) as well as for clearly visible goods such as 
houses and cars. For instance, Alpizar et al. (2005) and Carlsson et al. (2007) find an estimate of around 0.4-0.5, 
whereas the literature review by Wendner and Goulder (2008) argues in favor of a slightly lower interval, 0.2-
0.4. This suggests that positional externalities are associated with large welfare costs; see also Frank (2005).  
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perspective of the government). Yet, this is not the whole story as can seen from the second 
term, which depends on differences in the degree of positionality between the mimicker and 
the low-ability type. If the low-ability type is more positional than the mimicker both when 
young and old, this effect also works to increase  𝜇𝑡 since a decrease in 𝑐?̅? will in that case 
lead to a relaxation of the self-selection constraint (in addition to the pure efficiency gain of a 
smaller externality). However, if the mimicker is more positional than the low-ability type, 
such that the expression in square brackets is positive, increased reference consumption 
instead contributes to a relaxation of the self-selection constraint. In turn, this means that the 
second term in (14) is negative and contributes to reduce  𝜇𝑡. As such, in a second best world 
with information asymmetries, we cannot a priori rule out that an increase in 𝑐?̅? leads to 
higher welfare (even if this scenario does not appear very likely to us). 
   With equation (14) at our disposal, it is straight forward to show that the model set out 
above produces results analogous to those derived for a closed economy by Aronsson and 
Johansson-Stenman (2010). Let 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑧,𝑐 = (𝜕𝑈𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑧𝑖,𝑡)/(𝜕𝑈𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑐𝑖,𝑡) denote the marginal 
rate of substitution between leisure and private consumption and 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 = (𝜕𝑈𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑐𝑖,𝑡)/
(𝜕𝑈𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1) denote the marginal rate of substitution between present and future 
consumption for ability-type i of generation t, while 𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑧,𝑐
 and 𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥
 denote the 
corresponding marginal rates of substitution for the mimicker. We will summarize the optimal 
tax policy in terms of the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. The optimal second best policy based on a full set of instruments satisfies 
𝜃𝑖
𝑠 = 0 in combination with the following marginal labor income tax rates: 
𝜏1,𝑡 =
𝜆𝑡
∗
𝑤1,𝑡𝑛1,𝑡
(𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑧,𝑐 − 𝜙𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑧,𝑐) +
𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑧,𝑐
𝑤1,𝑡𝑁𝑡
𝜇𝑡
𝛾𝑡
   (15a) 
𝜏2,𝑡 =
𝑀𝑅𝑆2,𝑡
𝑧,𝑐
𝑤2,𝑡𝑁𝑡
𝜇𝑡
𝛾𝑡
     (15b) 
where 𝜆𝑡
∗ = 𝜆𝑡(𝜕?̂?2,𝑡/𝜕𝑐1,𝑡)/𝛾𝑡, and the following marginal capital income tax rates:  
𝜃1,𝑡+1 =
𝜆𝑡(𝜕𝑈2,𝑡/𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1)
𝛾𝑡+1𝑟𝑡+1𝑛1,𝑡
(𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 − 𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥) −
1
𝛾𝑡+1𝑟𝑡+1
(
𝜇𝑡
𝑁𝑡
− 𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡+1
) (16a) 
𝜃2,𝑡+1 = −
1
𝛾𝑡+1𝑟𝑡+1
(
𝜇𝑡
𝑁𝑡
− 𝑀𝑅𝑆2,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡+1
)    (16b) 
for all t. 
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Proof: see the Appendix. 
 
   The intuition as to why the source-based capital income tax rate is zero is that capital is 
perfectly mobile in to, and out of, the country: therefore, since the government of the small 
open economy treats the world market interest rate as exogenous, it will not use the source-
based tax. The marginal capital income tax rates implemented by the government in equations 
(16a) and (16b) thus coincide with the residence-based marginal tax rates, i.e., 𝜃1,𝑡+1 = 𝜃1,𝑡+1
𝑟  
and 𝜃2,𝑡+1 = 𝜃2,𝑡+1
𝑟 . 
   Equations (15a), (15b), (16a), and (16b) take the same form as their counterparts derived for 
a closed economy by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010), and the interpretations are the 
same as in their study. It is, nevertheless, worthwhile to discuss the insights from the 
proposition, since these insights will useful in the analysis to follow. The first term on the 
right hand side of equations (15a) and (16a), respectively, represents the policy rule that 
would be implemented for the low-ability type without any tax response to relative 
consumption concerns. There is no corresponding term in equation (15b) or (16b), meaning 
that the marginal labor and capital income tax rates implemented for the high-ability type 
would be zero in that case.
14
 All remaining terms are proportional to 𝜇 (either measured at t or 
t+1) and represent, therefore, policy adjustments to relative concerns. Note that the higher 𝜇𝑡, 
i.e., the larger the marginal social value of a decrease in 𝑐?̅?, ceteris paribus, the higher will be 
the marginal labor income tax rates implemented for both ability-types. As explained in the 
context of equation (14) above, a high value of 𝜇𝑡 may either reflect that the positional 
externality (as measured by the average degree of positionality) is large, and/or that the low-
ability type (the mimicked agent) is more positional than the mimicker. Finally, note that the 
marginal capital income tax rates depend on the difference between 𝜇𝑡 and 𝜇𝑡+1; the greater 
this difference, the larger is the welfare cost of consumption in period t compared to period 
t+1, ceteris paribus. As a consequence, the lower will be the optimal marginal capital income 
tax rates. 
   The flexible labor income tax and residence-based capital income tax (allowing for tax-
induced intercept and slope components of the individual budget constraints that may vary 
                                                          
14
 If all individuals share a common utility function, and if leisure is weakly separable from the other goods in 
the utility function, the first term on the right hand side of equation (16a) is zero. Therefore, if the social cost of 
relative consumption does not change over time (such that the right hand side of equation [16b] and the second 
term on the right hand side of equation [16a] are zero), this would reproduce the result in the seminal 
contribution by Ordover and Phelps (1979) for when there is no need to supplement an optimal labor income tax 
with marginal capital income taxation.   
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between ability-types and over time) together constitute a set of perfect instruments for 
influencing the labor supply and savings behavior, in exactly the same way as general, 
nonlinear labor and capital income taxes would do in a closed economy. This is also the 
reason as to why the policy rules for marginal income taxation derived for a closed economy 
carry over to the economy open to capital mobility examined here. 
   Note finally that the policy rules for marginal taxation in equations (15) and (16) would 
remain valid also if we were to relax the “small open economy assumption” and instead 
assume a large open economy, where the government is able to influence the world market 
interest rate. In a large open economy, whose government recognizes that the world market 
interest rate is a function of the net capital export, the results would change in two ways 
compared to Proposition 1. First, the optimal source-based capital income tax would no longer 
be equal to zero; it would, instead, follow an inverse elasticity rule based on the relationship 
between the world market interest rate and the net capital export. Second, the residence-based 
marginal capital income tax policy would have to be adjusted in response to the source-based 
tax such that the total marginal capital income tax rates satisfy equations (16a) and (16b).
15
 In 
qualitative terms, the tax policy response to relative consumption concerns would be exactly 
the same as in the small open economy characterized in Proposition 1. 
 
4 Optimal Tax Policy without Residence-Based Capital Income Taxes 
   The analysis in the preceding section presupposes that the government has access to a 
residence-based capital income tax. Even if the capital income taxes used in many countries 
share elements of both the residence and source principles, we argued in the introduction that 
a flexible residence-based tax requires a global information sharing system, which is likely to 
be difficult to implement in practice (even if steps in that direction have recently been taken). 
Without such a residence-based tax, Proposition 1 will no longer apply. It is thus interesting to 
analyze how the optimal use of the other tax instruments will change if the government is not 
able to freely use the residence-based tax. We will here take this argument to its extreme point 
by considering a scenario where the government is unable to use residence-based capital 
income taxation. 
   Without the residence-based tax, the model set out above will change in two ways. First, if 
𝜃𝑖,𝑡
𝑟 ≡ 0, then 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡
𝑠 for i=1,2 and the after-tax interest rate facing domestic residents is 
                                                          
15
 Aronsson and Sjögren (2014) present an analogous comparison between a small and large open economy 
when the government attempts to correct for a self-control problem generated by quasi-hyperbolic discounting. 
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fixed at the world market interest rate, i.e., 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 = 𝑟𝑡(1 − 𝜃𝑡) = ?̅?𝑡
𝑛 according to equation (4). 
Second, the government’s budget constraint changes to read  
0 = ∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑡[(𝑤𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 )𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑖,𝑡]𝑖=1,2 + ∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1Φ𝑖,𝑡𝑖=1,2 + (𝑟𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡
𝑛)𝐾𝑡       (17) 
since the tax base for the source-based tax is the domestic capital stock and not the domestic 
savings. 
   The optimal tax problem is to choose the policy vector (𝜃𝑡
𝑠, 𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 , 𝑇𝑖,𝑡, Φ𝑖,𝑡+1) for i=1,2 and 
all t to maximize the social welfare function in equation (11) subject to the self-selection and 
budget constraints in equations (12) and (17), respectively, as well as subject to equations (7), 
(8), and (10). In doing so, the government recognizes that 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 = ?̅?𝑡
𝑛 is exogenous. The 
Lagrangean is given by 
ℒ = ∑ ∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑈𝑖,𝑡
𝑖=1,2
∞
𝑡=0
+ ∑ 𝜆𝑡(𝑈2,𝑡 − ?̂?2,𝑡)
∞
𝑡=0
+ ∑ 𝜇𝑡 (𝑐?̅? − ∑
(𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1𝑥𝑖,𝑡)
𝑁𝑡
𝑖=1,2
)
∞
𝑡=0
 
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑡 [ ∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑡[(𝑤𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 )𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑖,𝑡]
𝑖=1,2
+ ∑ 𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1Φ𝑖,𝑡
𝑖=1,2
+ (𝑟𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡
𝑛)𝐾𝑡]
∞
𝑡=0
. 
Let us then turn to the solution to the optimal tax problem described here. For presentational 
convenience, we shall make use of the second best optimal tax formulas derived in subsection 
3.1 through the following short notation            𝜏1,𝑡
∗ =
𝜆𝑡
∗
𝑤1,𝑡𝑛1,𝑡
(𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑧,𝑐 − 𝜙𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑧,𝑐) +
𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑧,𝑐
𝑤1,𝑡𝑁𝑡
𝜇𝑡
𝛾𝑡
                                   (18a) 
𝜏2,𝑡
∗ =
𝑀𝑅𝑆2,𝑡
𝑧,𝑐
𝑤2,𝑡𝑁𝑡
𝜇𝑡
𝛾𝑡
     (18b) 
𝜃1,𝑡+1
∗ =
𝜆𝑡(𝜕𝑈2,𝑡/𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1)
𝛾𝑡+1𝑟𝑡+1𝑛1,𝑡
(𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 − 𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥) −
1
𝛾𝑡+1𝑟𝑡+1
(
𝜇𝑡
𝑁𝑡
− 𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡+1
) (19a) 
𝜃2,𝑡+1
∗ = −
1
𝛾𝑡+1𝑟𝑡+1
(
𝜇𝑡
𝑁𝑡
− 𝑀𝑅𝑆2,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡+1
).    (19b) 
   Equations (18) and (19) take the same form as their counterparts in equations (15) and (16); 
the only difference is that equations (18) and (19) are evaluated in the equilibrium examined 
here, which the symbol * serves to indicate. Equations (18) and (19) are thus interpretable in 
terms of the policy rules for marginal taxation of labor and capital income, respectively, that 
the government ideally would have preferred, if it had access to a full set of tax instruments. 
   To shorten the notation below, it is convenient to introduce the following compensated labor 
supply and saving responses to a change in the marginal wage rate: 
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𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 =
𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 + 𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑖,𝑡
> 0   and    
𝜕?̃?𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 =
𝜕𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 + 𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑖,𝑡
. 
The optimal tax policy is characterized in Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. Without the residence-based capital income tax instrument, the optimal tax 
policy satisfies 𝜃𝑖
𝑠 = 0 in combination with the following marginal labor income tax rates: 
              𝜏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
∗ + 𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ 𝛾𝑡+1𝑟𝑡+1
𝛾𝑡𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝜕?̃?𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛   for i=1,2 and all t.  (20) 
Proof: see the Appendix. 
 
   The optimal source-based capital income tax remains equal to zero also when the residence-
based instrument is absent. This is so because the capital stock is still perfectly elastic from 
the point of view of the government, whereas the labor income tax base is not. As a 
consequence, only the labor income tax will be used in response to the externalities that 
relative consumption concerns give rise to.
16
 
   Note that the optimal marginal labor income tax is in this case interpretable as a weighted 
sum of the policy rules for marginal labor and capital income taxation that the government 
would ideally have preferred. We can thus think of 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
∗  and 𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  in terms of latent optimal 
tax policy rules, while the formula for 𝜏𝑖,𝑡 is the actual policy rule for marginal labor income 
taxation when the government is constrained to the more limited set of tax instruments 
considered here. Therefore, 𝜏𝑖,𝑡 is given by a weighted average of 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
∗  and 𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  with the 
relative weight given by the ratio of compensated savings and labor supply responses to an 
increase in the marginal wage rate. The intuition is that when the residence-based capital 
income tax instrument is absent, the marginal labor income tax will be used to correct for the 
effects of relative consumption concerns on two margins: the atemporal consumption-leisure 
margin (as before), and the intertemporal consumption margin which a residence-based 
capital income tax would otherwise have targeted. 
                                                          
16
 An immediate objection to Propositions 1 and 2 is, of course, that small open economies often use capital 
income taxes despite that capital is (at least close to) perfectly mobile. We would, therefore, like to emphasize 
that the policy incentives characterized in equation (20) remain valid as long as the residence based capital 
income tax is not flexible in the sense described in subsection 3.1. For instance, with a positive, yet suboptimal, 
residence-based capital income tax, the optimal labor income tax can still be written in a way similar to equation 
(20), with the modification that  𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  is replaced by 𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ -𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1, where 𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1 is the actual marginal capital 
income tax rate facing ability-type i of generation t. 
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   Although the labor income tax is a direct instrument for influencing the atemporal 
consumption-leisure tradeoff, it is only an indirect (and imperfect) instrument for affecting the 
intertemporal consumption tradeoff. Therefore, whether the labor income tax is a useful 
instrument for influencing the savings behavior depends on how the saving responds to a 
budget neutral change in marginal labor income tax, which hints at the role of the multiplier 
(𝜕?̃?𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 )/(𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 ) attached to 𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  in equation (20). The larger (smaller) this 
multiplier, the larger the will be the relative weight attached to 𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  (𝜏𝑖,𝑡
∗ ). Economic theory 
gives no clear guidance to the sign of this multiplier. Whereas the compensated labor supply 
is increasing in the marginal net wage rate, the corresponding compensated savings response 
can be either positive or negative; let be that a positive sign appears to us as the most likely 
outcome.
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   Another important difference compared to subsection 3.1 is that society attaches a different 
marginal value to a decrease in the level of reference consumption here. In other words, the 
valuation procedure depends on the tax instruments that the government has at its disposal. By 
using the following short notations for compensated labor supply and savings responses to an 
increase in the level of reference consumption 
𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
=
𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑖,𝑡
,             
𝜕?̃?𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
=
𝜕𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 𝜕𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑖,𝑡
, 
𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
=
𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼𝑖,𝑡
𝑥 𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ𝑖,𝑡
,            
𝜕?̃?𝑖,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
=
𝜕𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼𝑖,𝑡
𝑥 𝜕𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ𝑖,𝑡
, 
we characterize this shadow price in Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3. Without the residence-based capital income tax instrument, the shadow price 
of a decrease in the level of reference consumption becomes 
𝜇𝑡 =
?̅?𝑡𝛾𝑡𝑁𝑡
1 − ?̅?𝑡
−
1
1 − ?̅?𝑡
[𝜆𝑡−1
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡
(?̂?2,𝑡
𝑥 − 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥 ) + 𝜆𝑡
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
(?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐 − 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐 )] 
−
1
1 − ?̅?𝑡
∑ (𝛾𝑡𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑤𝑖,𝑡∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
+ 𝛾𝑡−1𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
)
i=1,2
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 As long as the utility function is overall concave in consumption such that 
𝜕2𝑢𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑐𝑖,𝑡
2 +
𝜕2𝑢𝑖,𝑡
𝜕(∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 )2
+ 2
𝜕2𝑢𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑐𝑖,𝑡𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 < 0, 
a sufficient (not necessary) condition for a positive sign of this derivative is that consumption and leisure are 
weak complements in terms of the utility function. 
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                        −
1
1−?̅?𝑡
∑ (𝛾𝑡+1𝑟𝑡+1𝑛𝑖,𝑡∆𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕?̃?𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
+ 𝛾𝑡𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1∆𝜃𝑖,𝑡
𝜕?̃?𝑖,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
)𝑖=1,2                (21) 
for all t, where ∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
∗  and ∆𝜃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜃𝑖,𝑡
∗ = −𝜃𝑖,𝑡
∗ . 
 
Proof: see the Appendix. 
 
   The first row on the right hand side of equations (21) coincides with the shadow price 
derived under a full set of tax instruments given in equation (14). As such, these components 
are interpretable in the same general way as in the previous section. However, the second and 
third rows of equation (21) are novel and did not appear in equation (14). The reason as to 
why they vanished in equation (14) is that ∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡 = ∆𝜃𝑖,𝑡 = 0 for all t in case the government 
has a full set of tax instrument, in which the actual policy rules coincide with the latent rules 
ideally preferred by the government. In a second best optimum based on a full set of tax 
instruments, the labor supply and savings behavior will be chosen to maximize the social 
welfare (which the government induces the individuals to do through tax policy), which 
explains why a change in the level of reference consumption did not have any welfare effects 
via the labor supply and savings functions in Section 3. However, when this is no longer the 
case, i.e., when the tax instruments are not flexible enough to allow the government to 
exercise perfect control over the labor supply and savings, a change in the level of reference 
consumption will typically affect the shadow price also via the induced responses in the 
individuals’ labor supply and savings behavior. The terms in parenthesis in the second and 
third rows are reminiscent of tax revenue effects, although dependent on a discrepancy 
between the actual marginal tax rate and the marginal tax rate ideally preferred (i.e., the 
marginal tax policy that the government would chose if equipped with a full set of 
instruments). The reason as to why the labor supply and savings effects are compensated 
instead of uncompensated is that the lump-sum elements in the tax are optimally chosen, and 
the first order conditions for these lump-sum components are used in the calculation of 
equation (21). 
   To give a more thorough interpretation, consider the first term in parenthesis in the second 
row and suppose that ∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡 is positive, such that the actual marginal labor income tax rate 
exceeds the rate implied by the government’s ideal policy rule. This typically implies that 
individuals of ability-type i and generation t supply fewer work hours than ideally preferred, 
in which case an increase in the hours of work would be welfare improving. As such, if an 
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increase in 𝑐?̅? leads to an increase in the hours of work (which is reasonable as one would 
expect people prone to conspicuous consumption to work more than they would otherwise 
have done) such that 𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑐?̅? > 0, then this contributes to a decrease in the social marginal 
cost of the externality and thus to a lower 𝜇𝑡. The interpretation of the case where ∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡 is 
negative is analogous; yet with effects opposite to those just described. Note finally that 𝑐?̅? 
also affects generation t-1, meaning that the second term in parenthesis in the second row can 
be interpreted in a similar way. 
   The third row in equation (21) appears because a change in the level of reference 
consumption affects the savings behavior, and the terms in brackets are interpretable in the 
same general way as their counterparts in the second row. To exemplify, consider the first 
term in parenthesis which is proportional to ∆𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1. If ∆𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1 > 0, the actual marginal capital 
tax rate – which is zero here - exceeds the rate implied by the policy rule ideally preferred by 
the government in equation (19a) or (19b). This typically implies that individuals of ability-
type i and generation t save less than the government would have liked them to do, ceteris 
paribus, meaning that increased savings would lead to higher welfare. Therefore, if an 
increase in the level of reference contributes to less savings in the sense that ?̃?𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑐?̅? < 0 – 
which seems plausible to us - then this effect contributes to increase the social marginal cost 
of the externality which, in turn, implies a higher 𝜇𝑡. By analogy, if ∆𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1 < 0 while the 
other conditions remain as above, the first term in the second row would instead reduce the 
social marginal cost of the externality and, therefore, contribute to a lower 𝜇𝑡. 
 
Interpretation Based on a Simplified Model 
   To go further and examine whether the restriction imposed on the capital income tax 
induces the government to implement higher or lower marginal labor income tax rates than it 
would have done with a full set of tax instruments, we will discuss a simplified version of the 
model by adding two quite restrictive assumptions: (i) the self-selection constraint does not 
bind (such that 𝜆𝑡 = 0 for all t), and (ii) the individuals’ lifetime utility functions are additive 
and linear in the two measures of relative consumption. The second assumption means that 
equation (2) simplifies to read 
𝑈𝑖,𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖,𝑡(𝑐𝑖,𝑡, 𝑧𝑖,𝑡, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡+1) + 𝑘
𝑐∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 + 𝑘𝑥∆𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑥                 (22) 
for i=1,2 and all t, where 𝑘𝑐 > 0 and 𝑘𝑥 > 0 are fixed parameters. This functional form 
implies that the labor supply and saving functions become 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑖,𝑡(𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 , ?̅?𝑡
𝑛, 𝑇𝑖,𝑡Φ𝑖,𝑡+1) and 
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𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖,𝑡(𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 , ?̅?𝑡
𝑛, 𝑇𝑖,𝑡Φ𝑖,𝑡+1), respectively, which do not directly depend on the reference 
consumption levels. Furthermore, under assumptions (i) and (ii) equation (21) reduces to read 
𝜇𝑡 = ?̅?𝑡𝛾𝑡𝑁𝑡/(1 − ?̅?𝑡) > 0, which reflects that a ceteris paribus decrease in the level of 
reference consumption constitutes a pure efficiency gain through a smaller positional 
externality. Based on these additional assumptions, equation (20) reduces to (for i=1,2) 
𝜏𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑧,𝑐
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
?̅?𝑡
(1−?̅?𝑡)
− (
?̅?𝑡
(1−?̅?𝑡)
− 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 𝛾𝑡+1
𝛾𝑡
?̅?𝑡+1
(1−?̅?𝑡+1)
)
1
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝜕?̃?𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 .                  (23) 
Note also that if the government can borrow/lend in the international capital market at the 
interest rate ?̅?𝑡
𝑛, then 𝛾𝑡 = (1 + ?̅?𝑡
𝑛)𝛾𝑡+1 which, in turn, implies that 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥𝛾𝑡+1/𝛾𝑡 = 1. We 
can then derive the following corollary to Proposition 2: 
 
Corollary 1. Consider the special case where the self-selection constraint does not bind, the 
utility function takes the form of equation (22), and the government can borrow/lend abroad. 
Equation (20) then implies the following: 
 
(1) If 𝜕?̃?𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 > 0, then 
      𝜏𝑖,𝑡 > 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
∗  iff ?̅?𝑡+1 > ?̅?𝑡, and 𝜏𝑖,𝑡 < 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
∗  iff  ?̅?𝑡+1 < ?̅?𝑡. 
(2) If 𝜕?̃?𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 < 0, then 
     𝜏𝑖,𝑡 < 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
∗  iff  ?̅?𝑡+1 > ?̅?𝑡, and 𝜏𝑖,𝑡 > 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
∗   iff  ?̅?𝑡+1 < ?̅?𝑡. 
(3) If ?̅?𝑡+1 = ?̅?𝑡, then 𝜏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
∗ . 
 
   We will base most of the interpretation below on the case where the multiplier 𝜕?̃?𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛  is 
positive (which appears to us as the most realistic one). Let us first observe that if the self-
selection constraint does not bind and the utility functions are given as in equation (22), we 
have (as long as 𝛾𝑡 = (1 + ?̅?𝑡
𝑛)𝛾𝑡+1) 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝜃1,𝑡+1
∗ =  𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (?̅?𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑡). 
Therefore, ?̅?𝑡+1 > ?̅?𝑡 means that the government would ideally have preferred to implement a 
positive marginal capital tax in order to reduce savings, since the marginal positional 
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externality increases over time, i.e., the positional externality is larger in period t+1 than in 
period t. However, since this option is not available by assumption, the government uses the 
labor tax as an indirect (and imperfect) instrument to deter savings. If the compensated 
savings measure increases in response to an increase in the marginal wage rate such that 
𝜕?̃?𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 > 0, which is the case addressed in part (1) of the corollary, this is accomplished 
through a higher marginal labor income tax rate. The case where ?̅?𝑡+1 < ?̅?𝑡 correspondingly 
implies an incentive for the government to induce individuals to save more, which is 
accomplished through a lower marginal labor income tax rate. 
   The interpretation of part (2) of the corollary is analogous, except that this case is based on 
the assumption that 𝜕?̃?𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 < 0. The qualitative implications for policy will then be the 
opposite to those just described. Turning finally to part (3), ?̅?𝑡+1 = ?̅?𝑡 means 𝜃1,𝑡+1
∗ = 0. In 
other words, since the marginal positional externality does not change between periods t and 
t+1, the desire to correct for positional externalities provides no incentive for the government 
to modify the intertemporal consumption tradeoff faced by consumers. As a consequence, the 
absence of the residence-based capital income tax instrument does not lead to any 
modification of the policy rule for marginal labor income taxation. 
   The assumptions behind Corollary 1 are useful by allowing us to relate the relationship 
between 𝜏𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
∗  to the core mechanisms behind the relative consumption concerns. An 
important question is whether these insights carry over to a second best scenario with a 
binding self-selection constraint. It turns out that they do, albeit with some modification. If we 
continue to assume that the life-time utility functions are linear in the measures of relative 
consumption (allowing us to avoid the indirect effects of 𝑐?̅? on 𝜇𝑡 that are due to labor supply 
and savings responses), while at the same time assuming that the self-selection constraint 
binds, it turns out that the social shadow price of a decrease in the level of reference 
consumption takes the form of equation (14). In other words, it takes the same forms as it 
would have taken if the government had a full set of tax instruments. If we follow Aronsson 
and Johansson-Stenman (2010) and define the following summary measure of differences in 
the degree of positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type in period t: 
𝛼𝑡
𝑑 =
1
𝛾𝑡𝑁𝑡
[𝜆𝑡−1
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡
(?̂?2,𝑡
𝑥 − 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥 ) + 𝜆𝑡
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
(?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐 − 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐 )]               (24) 
this shadow price can then be written as 
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 𝜇𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡 𝛾𝑡
?̅?𝑡−𝛼𝑡
𝑑
1−?̅?𝑡
.                  (25) 
Therefore, Corollary 2 continues to remain valid for the high-ability type with the only 
modification that the relevant difference in positionality over time now in measured by 
 (?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝛼𝑡+1
𝑑 )/(1 − ?̅?𝑡+1) − (?̅?𝑡 − 𝛼𝑡
𝑑)/(1 − ?̅?𝑡)                (26) 
instead of by ?̅?𝑡+1−?̅?𝑡. The reason is, of course, that the social marginal benefit of decreased 
reference consumption at any time t will now also depend on whether mimickers are 
predominantly more (𝛼𝑡
𝑑 > 0) or less (𝛼𝑡
𝑑 < 0) positional than low-ability individuals. Part 1 
of the corollary, which is based on the assumption that 𝜕?̃?𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 > 0, will then be modified 
as follows for the high-ability type: 𝜏2,𝑡 >  (<)  𝜏2,𝑡
∗  iff (26) is positive (negative), and the 
modifications of parts 2 and 3 are analogous. For the low-ability type, it is not equally straight 
forward to adjust Corollary 1 to a second best economy with a binding self-selection 
constraint, since 𝜃1,𝑡+1
∗  now also depends on whether the marginal rate of substitution between 
present and future consumption facing the low-ability type exceeds, or falls short of, the 
corresponding marginal rate of substitution facing the mimicker. Therefore, to generalize the 
corollary for the low-ability type, we would also have to add  𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 > (<) 𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥
 to the 
other conditions required for  𝜏1,𝑡 >  (<)  𝜏1,𝑡
∗ . 
   This leads naturally to a second corollary to Proposition 2, focusing on the special case 
where the consumers are not concerned with relative consumption at all,
18
 in which case 
𝜇𝑡 = 0. This case thus shows how the tax policy in the conventional closed-economy two-
type model would be modified in an open economy where the residence-based capital income 
tax instrument is absent. 
 
Corollary 2. Suppose that the consumers are not concerned with their relative consumption 
compared to others. Equation (20) then implies the following: 
 
(1) If 𝜕?̃?1,𝑡/𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 > 0, then 
       𝜏1,𝑡 > 𝜏1,𝑡
∗   iff 𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 > 𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥
, and  𝜏1,𝑡 < 𝜏1,𝑡
∗   iff 𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 < 𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥
. 
(2) If 𝜕?̃?1,𝑡/𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 < 0, then 
                                                          
18
 That is 
𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡
𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 =
𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡
𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑥 = 0. 
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       𝜏1,𝑡 < 𝜏1,𝑡
∗   iff 𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 > 𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥
, and  𝜏1,𝑡 > 𝜏1,𝑡
∗   iff 𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 < 𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥
. 
(3) If 𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 = 𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥
, then 𝜏1,𝑡 = 𝜏1,𝑡
∗ . 
(4) 𝜏2,𝑡 = 𝜏2,𝑡
∗ = 0. 
 
   In the absence of any relative consumption comparisons, and if the government had access 
to a full set of instruments, only the low-ability type’s income would be subject to marginal 
taxation. In that case, the incentive to marginally tax or subsidize the low-ability type’s capital 
income would depend on whether the low-ability type attaches a larger or smaller marginal 
value to early-in-life (compared to later-in-life) consumption than the mimicker, i.e., whether 
𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥
 exceeds, or falls short of, 𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥
. This corresponds to the marginal capital income 
tax policy for a closed economy, which is analyzed in Brett (1997). Therefore, in an economy 
open to capital mobility, and where the government lacks a residence-based capital tax 
instrument, the marginal labor income tax implemented for the low-ability type will be 
modified correspondingly. The marginal labor income tax rate implemented for the high-
ability type remains equal to zero (as in a conventional two-type model). 
 
5. Conclusions 
   As far as we know, this is the first paper analyzing optimal capital and labor income 
taxation in an economy which is open to capital mobility, and where people are concerned 
with their relative consumption. The framework is that of a small open economy where capital 
is perfectly mobile while people (in the form of overlapping generations) are not, and where 
the government uses nonlinear taxation for purposes of redistribution and correction for 
positional externalities.  
   The take home message of the paper is that the tax policy response to relative consumption 
concerns crucially depends on whether the government can perfectly observe (and hence tax) 
returns on savings abroad, such that residence-based capital income taxes can be used to their 
full potential. With a full set of tax instruments, including a flexible residence-based capital 
income tax, marginal income tax policies derived for a closed economy largely carry over to 
the small open economy analyzed here. In contrast, when returns on savings abroad cannot be 
observed, the optimal tax policy rules become very different. In this case, also capital income 
taxes on domestic savings will be completely ineffective, since such taxes would induce the 
consumers to move their savings abroad. As a consequence, there is no room for capital 
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income taxation anymore, and the labor income tax must therefore indirectly also reflect the 
corrective purpose that the absent capital income tax would otherwise have had. The policy 
rules for marginal labor income taxation then become rather complex in the sense of 
reflecting both the conventional second-best problem due to asymmetric information, since 
the ability-type cannot be observed directly, and another second-best problem due to that 
capital income taxation cannot be used. Among other results, we show that the optimal 
marginal labor income tax rate implemented for any ability-type can be written as a weighted 
sum of two components: (i) the policy rule for marginal labor income taxation the government 
would have implemented if the residence-based capital income tax instrument were available 
(without restrictions), and (ii) the policy rule for marginal capital income taxation the 
government would have chosen if the residence-based instrument were available. The 
compensated savings response to an increase in the marginal labor income tax rate largely 
determines the effectiveness of the labor income tax as an (indirect) instrument to correct for 
intertemporal positional externalities. 
   While this paper has taken large steps towards understanding optimal income taxation when 
the residents of a small open economy engage in status comparisons, there are several 
possible extensions for future research.  First, we have assumed away labor mobility 
completely in order to keep the analysis as simple as possible. Although we conjecture that 
most qualitative results will continue to hold in a more general framework with imperfect 
labor mobility, such an extension would still be useful, not least as a basis on which to 
develop a numerical model of optimal taxation for an open economy. Second, we have solely 
focused on a single country and thus neither addressed the welfare costs of strategic 
interaction nor the scope for tax policy cooperation between different countries. As a 
consequence, there is still room for much more work  on redistributive taxation and public 
expenditure in economies where people care about social comparisons.     
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Proposition 1 addresses the optimal tax policy implemented for generation t when the 
government has access to a full set of tax instruments. 
 
Source-based capital tax 
The first order condition for 𝜃𝑡
𝑠 can be written as 
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∑ [
𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝜃𝑡
𝑠 𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜕𝑟𝑡
𝜕𝜃𝑡
𝑠 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1]𝑖=1,2 − 𝑟𝑡𝑄𝑡 − 𝜃𝑡
𝑠 𝜕𝑟𝑡
𝜕𝜃𝑡
𝑠 𝑄𝑡 − 𝜃𝑡
𝑠𝑟𝑡
𝜕𝑄𝑡
𝜕𝜃𝑡
𝑠 = 0.              (A1) 
By using 𝐾𝑡 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1𝑖 − 𝑄𝑡, and ∑ (𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝜃𝑡
𝑠)𝑖 𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + (𝜕𝑟𝑡/𝜕𝜃𝑡
𝑠)𝐾𝑡 = 0 from the zero 
profit condition, equation (A1) can be rewritten to read 
−𝑟𝑡𝑄𝑡 + (1 − 𝜃𝑡
𝑠)
𝜕𝑟𝑡
𝜕𝜃𝑡
𝑠 𝑄𝑡 − 𝜃𝑡
𝑠𝑟𝑡
𝜕𝑄𝑡
𝜕𝜃𝑡
𝑠 = 0.               (A2) 
Finally, since ?̅?𝑡
𝑛 is treated as exogenous by the government of the small open economy, 
equation (4) implies (𝜕𝑟𝑡/𝜕𝜃𝑡
𝑠)(1 − 𝜃𝑡
𝑠) = 𝑟𝑡. Substituting into equation (A2) gives 𝜃𝑡
𝑠 = 0. 
 
Marginal Labor and Capital Income Tax Rates 
The first order conditions for 𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 , 𝑇1,𝑡, 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 , and Φ1,𝑡+1, respectively, which are used to 
derive the optimal marginal income tax rates implemented for the low-ability type, can be 
written as follows, if we use 𝜃𝑡
𝑠 = 0 and the equilibrium condition given by equation (4): 
0 =
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
= 𝑛1,𝑡𝑙1,𝑡 [(
𝜕𝑈1,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑈1,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 ) − 𝛾𝑡] + 𝛾𝑡𝑛1,𝑡(𝑤1,𝑡 − 𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑛  
+𝛾𝑡+1𝑛1,𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 − 𝜇𝑡
𝑛1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 − 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑛1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛  
−𝜆𝑡 [𝑙1,𝑡 (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 ) + {𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 ) − 𝜙
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕?̂?1,𝑡
}
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 ] 
−𝜆𝑡 [(1 + 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 ) (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ) − (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆1𝑡
𝑐 )]
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛             (A3a) 
 
 
0 =
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
= −𝑛1,𝑡 [(
𝜕𝑈1,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑈1,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 ) − 𝛾𝑡] + 𝛾𝑡𝑛1,𝑡(𝑤1,𝑡 − 𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
 
+𝛾𝑡+1𝑛1,𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
− 𝜇𝑡
𝑛1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
− 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑛1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
 
−𝜆𝑡 [− (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 ) + {𝑤1𝑡
𝑛 (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 ) − 𝜙
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕?̂?1,𝑡
}
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
] 
−𝜆𝑡 [(1 + 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 ) (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ) − (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 )]
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
            (A3b) 
 
0 =
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 = 𝑛1,𝑡𝑠1,𝑡 [(
𝜕𝑈1,𝑡
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
+
𝜕𝑈1,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ) − 𝛾𝑡+1] + 𝛾𝑡𝑛1,𝑡(𝑤1,𝑡 − 𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛  
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+𝛾𝑡+1𝑛1,𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 − 𝜇𝑡
𝑛1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
𝜕𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 − 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑛1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛  
−𝜆𝑡 [{𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 ) − 𝜙
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕?̂?1,𝑡
}
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛 + 𝑠1,𝑡 (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡+1
𝑥 )] 
−𝜆𝑡 [(1 + 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 ) (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ) − (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 )]
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛             (A3c) 
 
0 =
𝜕ℒ
𝜕Φ1,𝑡+1
= −𝑛1,𝑡 [(
𝜕𝑈1,𝑡
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
+
𝜕𝑈1,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ) − 𝛾𝑡+1] + 𝛾𝑡𝑛1,𝑡(𝑤1,𝑡 − 𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕Φ1,𝑡+1
 
+𝛾𝑡+1𝑛1,𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕Φ1,𝑡+1
− 𝜇𝑡
𝑛1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
𝜕Φ1,𝑡+1
− 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑛1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
𝜕Φ1,𝑡+1
 
−𝜆𝑡 [{𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 ) − 𝜙
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕?̂?1,𝑡
}
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕Φ1,𝑡+1
− (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡+1
𝑥 )] 
−𝜆𝑡 [(1 + 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 ) (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ) − (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 )]
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕Φ1,𝑡+1
.            (A3d) 
In equations (A3a)-(A3d), we have used the short notations 
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 = 𝑙1,𝑡 + 𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 −
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛  
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
= −1 + 𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
−
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
 
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
𝜕𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 = 𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 −
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛  
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
𝜕Φ1,𝑡+1
= 𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕Φ1,𝑡+1
−
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕Φ1,𝑡+1
 
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 = (1 + 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛  
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
= (1 + 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
 
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 = 𝑠1,𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛  
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
𝜕Φ1,𝑡+1
= −1 + (1 + 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕Φ1,𝑡+1
. 
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The corresponding first order conditions for 𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛 , 𝑇2,𝑡, 𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 , and Φ2,𝑡+1, respectively, which 
are used to derive the marginal income tax rates implemented for the high-ability type, are 
written as follows: 
0 =
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑤2,𝑡
= [(𝑛2,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡)𝑙2,𝑡 (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐2,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆2,𝑡
𝑐 ) − 𝑛2,𝑡𝛾𝑡] + 𝛾𝑡𝑛2,𝑡(𝑤2,𝑡 − 𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡
𝜕𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛  
             +𝛾𝑡+1𝑛2,𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡
𝜕𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛 − 𝜇𝑡
𝑛2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑐2,𝑡
𝜕𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛 − 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑛2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1
𝜕𝑥2,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛                              (A3e) 
0 =
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
= − [(𝑛2,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡) (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐2,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆2,𝑡
𝑐 ) − 𝛾𝑡] + 𝛾𝑡𝑛2,𝑡(𝑤2,𝑡 − 𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
 
                 +𝛾𝑡+1𝑛2,𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
− 𝜇𝑡
𝑛2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑐2,𝑡
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
− 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑛2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1
𝜕𝑥2,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
                           (A3f) 
0 =
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 = 𝑠2,𝑡 [(𝑛2,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡) (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑥2,𝑡+1
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆2,𝑡+1
𝑥 ) − 𝑛2,𝑡𝛾𝑡+1] + 𝛾𝑡𝑛2,𝑡(𝑤2,𝑡 − 𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡
𝜕𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛  
+𝛾𝑡+1𝑛2,𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡
𝜕𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 − 𝜇𝑡
𝑛2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑐2,𝑡
𝜕𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 − 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑛2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1
𝜕𝑥2,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛             (A3g) 
0 =
𝜕ℒ
𝜕Φ2,𝑡+1
= − [(𝑛2,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡) (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑥2,𝑡+1
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆2,𝑡+1
𝑥 ) − 𝑛2,𝑡𝛾𝑡+1] + 𝛾𝑡𝑛2,𝑡(𝑤2,𝑡 − 𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡
𝜕Φ2,𝑡+1
 
+𝛾𝑡+1𝑛2,𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡
𝜕Φ2,𝑡+1
− 𝜇𝑡
𝑛2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑐2,𝑡
𝜕Φ2,𝑡+1
− 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑛2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1
𝜕𝑥2,𝑡+1
𝜕Φ2,𝑡+1
            (A3h) 
where 
𝜕𝑐2,𝑡
𝜕𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛 = 𝑙2,𝑡 + 𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡
𝜕𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛 −
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡
𝜕𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛  
𝜕𝑐2,𝑡
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
= −1 + 𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
−
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
 
𝜕𝑐2,𝑡
𝜕𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 = 𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡
𝜕𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 −
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡
𝜕𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛  
𝜕𝑐2,𝑡
𝜕Φ2,𝑡+1
= 𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡
𝜕Φ2,𝑡+1
−
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡
𝜕Φ2,𝑡+1
 
𝜕𝑥2,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛 = (1 + 𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡
𝜕𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛  
𝜕𝑥2,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
= (1 + 𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
 
27 
 
𝜕𝑥2,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 = 𝑠2,𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡
𝜕𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛  
𝜕𝑥2,𝑡+1
𝜕Φ2,𝑡+1
= −1 + (1 + 𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡
𝜕Φ2,𝑡+1
. 
Consider first the marginal labor income and capital income tax rates implemented for the 
low-ability type. Multiply the right hand side of equation (A3b) by 𝑙1,𝑡 and add the resulting 
expression to the right hand side of equation (A3a). This gives, after some manipulations, 
𝛾𝑡𝑛1,𝑡Ω1,𝑡 (
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 +
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
𝑙1,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑡+1𝑛1,𝑡Ψ1,t (
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 +
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
𝑙1,𝑡) = 0              (A4) 
where 
                            Ω1,𝑡 = 𝜏1,𝑡𝑤1,𝑡 −
𝜆𝑡
∗
𝑛1,𝑡
(𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑧,𝑐 − 𝜙𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑧,𝑐) +
𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑧,𝑐
𝑁𝑡
𝜇𝑡
𝛾𝑡
                            (A5) 
        Ψ1,t = 𝜃1,𝑡+1𝑟𝑡+1 −
𝜆𝑡(𝜕𝑈2,𝑡/𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1)
𝛾𝑡+1𝑛1,𝑡
(𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 − 𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥) +
1
𝛾𝑡+1
(
𝜇𝑡
𝑁𝑡
− 𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡+1
).    (A6) 
Similarly, multiply the right hand side of equation (A3d) by 𝑠1,𝑡 and add the resulting 
expression to the right hand side of equation (A3c). This gives 
𝛾𝑡𝑛1,𝑡Ω1,𝑡 (
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 +
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕Φ1,𝑡+1
𝑠1,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑡+1𝑛1,𝑡Ψ1,t (
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 +
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕Φ1,𝑡+1
𝑠1,𝑡) = 0.   (A7) 
Equation system (A4) and (A7) is solved by setting Ω1,𝑡 = 0 and Ψ1,t = 0, which gives the 
marginal labor income and capital income tax rates for the low-ability type in equation (15a) 
and (15b), respectively. The marginal labor income and capital income tax rates implemented 
for the high-ability type can be derived in exactly the same way by using equations (A3e)-
(A3h).█ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Proposition 2 derives the marginal labor income tax rates and the source-based capital income 
tax in the case where the residence-based capital income tax instrument is absent, in which 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛  no longer constitutes a decision-variable for the government. By using the same type of 
calculations as in equations (A1) and (A2), it follows that 𝜃𝑡
𝑠 = 0 also in this case. 
   Turning to marginal labor income taxation, consider once again the formula implemented 
for the low-ability type. The first order conditions for 𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 , 𝑇1,𝑡, and Φ1,𝑡+1 take the same 
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general form as in equations (A3a), (A3b), (A3d), respectively, with the modification that 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛 = ?̅?𝑡
𝑛 for i=1,2. Since 𝜃𝑡
𝑠 = 0, this also means that 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 = 0 in equations (A3a), 
(A3b), and (A3d). The analogue to equation (A4) can thus be written as 
𝛾𝑡𝑛1,𝑡Ω1,𝑡 (
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 +
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
𝑙1,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑡+1𝑛1,𝑡𝐵1,t (
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 +
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
𝑙1,𝑡) = 0              (A8) 
where Ω1,𝑡 is given by equation (A5), and 
𝐵1,t = −
𝜆𝑡(𝜕?̂?2,𝑡/𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1)
𝛾𝑡+1𝑛1,𝑡
(𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 − 𝑀𝑅?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥) +
1
𝛾𝑡+1
(
𝜇𝑡
𝑁𝑡
− 𝑀𝑅𝑆1,𝑡
𝑐,𝑥 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡+1
). 
Using equation (A5) in equation (A8) and solving for 𝜏1,𝑡 gives equation (20) for the low-
ability type. The marginal labor income tax implemented for the high-ability type can be 
derived in exactly the same way by using equations (A3e), (A3f), and (A3h) together with the 
additional restriction 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 =0.█ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
By using 𝜃𝑡
𝑠 = 0, the first order condition for 𝑐?̅? can be written as 
0 =
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑐?̅?
= − (𝑛1,𝑡
𝜕𝑈1,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 + (𝑛2,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡)
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆2,𝑡
𝑐 − 𝜆𝑡
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 ) 
− (𝑛1,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑈1,𝑡−1
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑥 + (𝑛2,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑡−1)
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡−1
𝜕∆2,𝑡
𝑥 − 𝜆𝑡−1
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑥 ) 
+𝜇𝑡 (1 −
𝑛1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
−
𝑛2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑐2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
−
𝑛1,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
−
𝑛2,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑥2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
) 
−𝜇𝑡−1 (
𝑛1,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
+
𝑛2,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
) − 𝜇𝑡+1 (
𝑛1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
+
𝑛2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1
𝜕𝑥2,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
) 
+𝛾𝑡 [𝑛1,𝑡(𝑤1,𝑡 − 𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
+ 𝑛2,𝑡(𝑤2,𝑡 − 𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
] 
+𝛾𝑡−1 [𝑛1,𝑡−1(𝑤1,𝑡−1 − 𝑤1,𝑡−1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
+ 𝑛2,𝑡−1(𝑤2,𝑡−1 − 𝑤2,𝑡−1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
] 
−𝜆𝑡 [𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 ) − 𝜙
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕?̂?1,𝑡
]
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
 
−𝜆𝑡−1 [𝑤1,𝑡−1
𝑛 (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡−1
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕∆1,𝑡−1
𝑐 ) − 𝜙
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕?̂?1,𝑡−1
]
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
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−𝜆𝑡 [(1 + 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 ) (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ) − (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 )]
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
 
−𝜆𝑡−1 [(1 + 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑛 ) (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡−1
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑥 ) − (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡−1
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡−1
𝜕∆1,𝑡−1
𝑐 )]
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
.                   (A9) 
In equation (A9), we have used the short notations 𝜕𝑐𝑖,𝑡−𝑗/𝜕𝑐?̅? = 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑛 (𝜕𝑙𝑖,𝑡−𝑗/𝜕𝑐?̅?) −
𝜕𝑠𝑖,𝑡−𝑗/𝜕𝑐?̅? and 𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑡+𝑗/𝜕𝑐?̅? = (1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡+𝑗
𝑛 )(𝜕𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑗/𝜕𝑐?̅?) for i=1,2 and j=0,1. 
   Next, multiply the right hand side of equation (A3b) by 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐  and the right hand side of 
equation (A3f) by 𝛼2,𝑡
𝑐 . Also, evaluate equations (A3d) and (A3h) for generation t-1, and then 
multiply by 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥  and 𝛼2,𝑡
𝑥 , respectively. This gives 
0 =
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐 = −𝑛1,𝑡 [(
𝜕𝑈1,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑈1,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 ) − 𝛾𝑡] 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐 + 𝛾𝑡𝑛1,𝑡(𝑤1,𝑡 − 𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐  
+𝛾𝑡+1𝑛1,𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐 − 𝜇𝑡
𝑛1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐 − 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑛1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐  
−𝜆𝑡 [− (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 ) + {𝑤1𝑡
𝑛 (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 ) − 𝜙
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕?̂?1,𝑡
}
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
] 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐  
−𝜆𝑡 [(1 + 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 ) (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ) − (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 )]
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐           (A10a) 
0 =
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
𝛼2,𝑡
𝑐 = − [(𝑛2,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡) (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐2,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡
𝜕∆2,𝑡
𝑐 ) − 𝛾𝑡] 𝛼2,𝑡
𝑐 + 𝛾𝑡𝑛2,𝑡(𝑤2,𝑡 − 𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
𝛼2,𝑡
𝑐  
                 +𝛾𝑡+1𝑛2,𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
𝛼2,𝑡
𝑐 − 𝜇𝑡
𝑛2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑐2,𝑡
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
𝛼2,𝑡
𝑐  
                                    −𝜇𝑡+1
𝑛2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1
𝜕𝑥2,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
𝛼2,𝑡
𝑐                                                                      (A10b) 
0 =
𝜕ℒ
𝜕Φ1,𝑡
𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥 = −𝑛1,𝑡−1 [(
𝜕𝑈1,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑈1,𝑡−1
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑥 ) − 𝛾𝑡] 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥  
+𝛾𝑡−1𝑛1,𝑡−1(𝑤1,𝑡−1 − 𝑤1,𝑡−1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ1,𝑡
𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥  
+𝛾𝑡𝑛1,𝑡−1(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ1,𝑡
𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥 − 𝜇𝑡−1
𝑛1,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ1,𝑡
𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥 − 𝜇𝑡
𝑛1,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡
𝜕Φ1,𝑡
𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥  
−𝜆𝑡−1 [{𝑤1,𝑡−1
𝑛 (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡−1
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕∆1,𝑡−1
𝑐 ) − 𝜙
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕?̂?1,𝑡−1
}
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ1,𝑡
− (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑥 )] 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥  
−𝜆𝑡−1 [(1 + 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑛 ) (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡−1
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑥 ) − (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡−1
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡−1
𝜕∆1,𝑡−1
𝑐 )]
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ1,𝑡
𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥 .        (A10c) 
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0 =
𝜕ℒ
𝜕Φ2,𝑡
𝛼2,𝑡
𝑥 = − [(𝑛2,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑡−1) (
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑥2,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑈2,𝑡−1
𝜕∆2,𝑡
𝑥 ) − 𝑛2,𝑡−1𝛾𝑡] 𝛼2,𝑡
𝑥  
+𝛾𝑡−1𝑛2,𝑡−1(𝑤2,𝑡−1 − 𝑤2,𝑡−1
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ2,𝑡
𝛼2,𝑡
𝑥 + 𝛾𝑡𝑛2,𝑡−1(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑛 )
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ2,𝑡
𝛼2,𝑡
𝑥  
−𝜇𝑡−1
𝑛2,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐2,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ2,𝑡
− 𝜇𝑡
𝑛2,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑥2,𝑡
𝜕Φ2,𝑡
𝛼2,𝑡
𝑥 .                                                     (A10d) 
Subtracting equation (A10a)-(A10d) from equation (A9), and then using the degrees of 
positionality in equation (3) such that 
 
𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡
𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 (
𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑐𝑖,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡
𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 )   and    
𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡
𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑥 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡
𝑥 (
𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑡
+
𝜕𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1
𝜕∆𝑖,𝑡
𝑥 )   for i=1,2, 
we obtain 
0 =
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑐?̅?
= 𝜇𝑡 (1 −
(𝑛1,𝑡𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐 + 𝑛2,𝑡𝛼2,𝑡
𝑐 + 𝑛1,𝑡−1𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥 + 𝑛2,𝑡−1𝛼2,𝑡
𝑥 )
𝑁𝑡
) 
−𝛾𝑡(𝑛1,𝑡𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐 + 𝑛2,𝑡𝛼2,𝑡
𝑐 + 𝑛1,𝑡−1𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥 + 𝑛2,𝑡−1𝛼2,𝑡
𝑥 ) 
+𝜆𝑡 (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 ) (?̂?2,𝑡
𝑐 − 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐 ) + 𝜆𝑡−1 (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑥 ) (?̂?2,𝑡
𝑥 − 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥 ) 
+ [𝛾𝑡𝑛1,𝑡(𝑤1,𝑡 − 𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 ) − 𝜇𝑡
𝑛1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 ] (
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
) 
−𝜆𝑡 [𝑤1,𝑡
𝑛 (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 ) − 𝜙
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕?̂?1,𝑡
] (
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
) 
+ [𝛾𝑡𝑛2,𝑡(𝑤2,𝑡 − 𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛 ) − 𝜇𝑡
𝑛2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝑤2,𝑡
𝑛 ] (
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼2,𝑡
𝑐
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
) 
+ [𝛾𝑡−1𝑛1,𝑡−1(𝑤1,𝑡−1 − 𝑤1,𝑡−1
𝑛 ) − 𝜇𝑡−1
𝑛1,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡−1
𝑤1,𝑡−1
𝑛 ] (
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ1,𝑡
) 
−𝜆𝑡−1 [𝑤1,𝑡−1
𝑛 (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡−1
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕∆1,𝑡−1
𝑐 ) − 𝜙
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕?̂?1,𝑡−1
] (
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥
𝜕𝑙1,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ1,𝑡
) 
+ [𝛾𝑡−1𝑛2,𝑡−1(𝑤2,𝑡−1 − 𝑤2,𝑡−1
𝑛 ) − 𝜇𝑡−1
𝑛2,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡−1
𝑤2,𝑡−1
𝑛 ] (
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼2,𝑡
𝑥
𝜕𝑙2,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ2,𝑡
) 
[𝜇𝑡
𝑛1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
− 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑛1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1
(1 + 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 )] (
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
) 
−𝜆𝑡 [(1 + 𝑟1,𝑡+1
𝑛 ) (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡+1
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ) − (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑐 )] (
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑐
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡
𝜕𝑇1,𝑡
) 
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[𝜇𝑡
𝑛2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
− 𝜇𝑡+1
𝑛2,𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1
(1 + 𝑟2,𝑡+1
𝑛 )] (
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼2,𝑡
𝑐
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡
𝜕𝑇2,𝑡
) 
[𝜇𝑡−1
𝑛1,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡−1
− 𝜇𝑡
𝑛1,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡
(1 + 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑛 )] (
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ1,𝑡
) 
−𝜆𝑡−1 [(1 + 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑛 ) (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑥1,𝑡
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕∆1,𝑡
𝑥 ) − (
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐1,𝑡−1
+
𝜕?̂?2,𝑡−1
𝜕∆1,𝑡−1
𝑐 )] (
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼1,𝑡
𝑥
𝜕𝑠1,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ1,𝑡
) 
                           + [𝜇𝑡−1
𝑛2,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡−1
− 𝜇𝑡
𝑛2,𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡
(1 + 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑛 )] (
𝜕𝑠2,𝑡−1
𝜕𝑐?̅?
− 𝛼2,𝑡
𝑥 𝜕𝑠2,𝑡−1
𝜕Φ2,𝑡
).                       (A11) 
Finally, collecting terms and using the definitions of 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
∗ , 𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ , 𝜏𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ , and 𝜃𝑖,𝑡
∗  in equations 
(18) and (19) to calculate ∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡
∗ , ∆𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ = −𝜃𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ , ∆𝜏𝑖,𝑡−1 =
𝜏𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜏𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ , and ∆𝜃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜃𝑖,𝑡
∗ = −𝜃𝑖,𝑡
∗  gives equation (21). 
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